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DCI TESTIMONY
before
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
Defense Subcommittee
re Covert Action

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26 January 1982

Beginning in 1974 and 1975, the Soviet Union undertook a new, much more aggressive strategy in the Third World. They found destabilization, subversion and the backing of insurgents in other countries around the world attractive and relatively risk free. Exploiting the availability first of Cuba and subsequently of other countries to serve as Soviet surrogates or proxies, they are able to limit the political, economic and military cost of intervention.

Over the last several years the Soviets and their allies have supported, directly or indirectly, radical regimes or insurgencies in more than a dozen countries in every part of the Third World. The United States and its friends have had difficulty countering these insurgencies. It is much easier and much less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for us and our friends to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt the internal peace and economic stability of a small country. At the same time, it is well beyond our economic or military means to provide the kind of large-scale overt economic and military assistance to all the countries in the Third World necessary to face down Soviet or Soviet proxy-supported insurgencies.

But the United States cannot simply sit back and allow the Soviets and their friends to undermine governments throughout the Third World that are friendly to the United States. Accordingly, Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan have attempted to combat these Soviet-backed insurgencies and subversion effort by helping friendly governments resist them.

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